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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN ROOFING COMPANY AND/OR : 
EMPLOYER'S MUTUAL LIABILITY, 
: Court of Appeals 
Peti tioners/Appellants, : 
: Case No. 870189-CA 
vs. : 
GEORGE ROY GREEN, THE INDUSTRIAL : 
COMMISSION OF UTAH AND THE SECOND : 
INJURY FUND, : Category No. 6 
Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GEORGE ROY GREEN 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to review final orders of the Utah State 
Industrial Commission is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to §78-2a-3, Utah__Cqde_Ann. 
DETERMIN1T1VE PROVISIONS 
Section 35-1-75, Utah Codq^Arin., is dot ermi ni t i ve in 
resolving the issue relating to an injured employee's rate of 
compensation. A copy of this provision is set forth in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September, 1985, George R. Green was an employee of 
American Roofing Company. He had been cmployorl for thr^o years 
as a roof repairman. (R. 50) Green was compcnscBted by American 
Roofing at a wage rate of $15.47 an hour. (R. 34) During the 
14 weeks preceding his industrial accident, Green worked 
approximately 13 hours each week. (R. 34) 
At the time of the occurrence giving rise to his 
claim for benefits, Green was suffering from advanced degen-
eration of his lumbar discs with large hypertrophic spurs. (R. 
247) Green claims he sustained a compensable accident on 
September 6, 1985. Additionally, he claims that as a result of 
this industrial accident, he is permanently and totally 
disabled. 
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on September 6, Green was 
unloading debris which he had generated repairing roofs that 
morning. The debris, gravel, leaves and asphalt, was contained 
in a five gallon bucket which was located in the center of the 
bed of his pickup truck. (R. 22-24) Green estimated the weight 
of the filled bucket to be approximately 30 pounds. 
Standing beside the pickup truck, Green leaned over 
the side of the truck and lifted the bucket. As he was remov-
ing the bucket from the truck, it snagged onto another bucket. 
When this occurred, Green experienced "terrific pain" in his 
lower back. (R. 24-25) For a minute or two he was motionless, 
hanging on to the side of the truck. 
After the passage of several minutes, Green was able 
to get into his car and drive home. He did not complete his 
job responsibilities that day, and he has been unable to return 
to work. (R. 26-27) 
George Green was admitted to Holy Cross Hospital on 
September 25, 1986 for a lumbar myelogram and a CT scan. After 
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Following Mr. Green's evaluation by the medical 
panel, Mr. Green was referred to the Utah State Division of 
Rehabilitation Services. Richard Olsen, a rehabilitative 
counselor, rendered an opinion that in light of Mr. Green's 
limited academic background, lack of transferable skills and 
continuing medical problems, he was not a feasible candidate 
for rehabilitation. (R. 255) 
Based upon the record, Judge Martinez rendered his 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order finding George 
Green to have sustained a compensable industrial accident, 
thereby entitling him to a finding of permanent total dis-
ability pursuant to Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Ann. These 
findings were confirmed upon review by the Utah State 
Industrial Commission. A copy of Judge Martinez1 order, a 
supplemental order and the order of the Utah State Industrial. 
Commission are appended to appellants' brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMF.NT 
The Utah Court of Appeals reviews decisions of the 
Utah State Industrial Commission to insure that they are 
reasonable and consistent with statutory provisions. 
The Commission decision that George R. Green 
sustained a compensable industrial accident falls within the 
limits of reasonableness. 
Green did not expect to sustain a disabling iniury 
when he lifted a bucket of debris from his truck. The exertion 
Il llMI I I  il h i t 
igagt-d • .'[•!•. as 'W»M I C P • r>* • <JV , p e r s o n . 
Th^ i pduQf * i ^  • '"n-nni; oc ,, *.~ ^., - p f , impijLe :i Gi ee i :t" s 
t - i i i I i iii ( i'A- v w^ge, 
ARGUMENT 
u) 
C O M M I S S I O N S I N T I I * I " I T A T I O N n r M*- STATMT. 
i A " . n N A I 1 Ml .- ' - ' ' * f ' 
n v i P w r i Q a d m j •. i s i r <i5 i r i dec is i - 'H , - ^M .*-p. 
cout t a f !" i - ~-
more e x t o n b . ; c c x p i i j enc * Mi*- a J n i M n s r a t i vc aqr>n; 
C o n s t r u c t i o n O f S^ a i u t r-c- [•-. u r v / o r n m o r * ' a ' . v ^ n ' - ' ' - < - ^v.,->> - r .: 
11 i e i i a <:l i i 111 i :i := t i a • t j : • i i i s g .i E • i i g i « E • e t. \ E? i g 1 11 u L a n nop i . o\ 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S e r v i c e s v . P u b l i c S e r v i c e Comn-. »:-J" / • *•'• 
( U t a h 1 9 8 3 ) . 
' norm : v :>•*{ , ; f ..t ~ if 
own r r ' T e r e n c o f o r p' • I w v l u M n n r n i " ' ^ ^ n r * - . U I P M ^ -
S 1 r»< • T l f , i l n i ' ' • * »- r . < 
a - - * : . _ • - ' - • ' c n . i a s M f i a b i o -
ness as i n - a s u r e ^ 
j i ' d 
i ^ i ! f i r s } a i 
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s and ra» i ^n . i 
_L4i -JU 
1 QP" 
n;i .:: t r ; a J Comm i s: 
•<-d. 
» ^ n v 
- 5 -
POINT II 
AN INTERNAL FAILURE OCCURS BY ACCIDENT 
IF IT IS UNEXPECTED. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently set guidelines to be 
applied in determining whether an injury constitutes a compens-
able industrial accident. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986). A two step procedure is applied. 
First, the finder of fact must determine whether the injured 
worker sustained an accident. If so, a determination must then 
occur whether a causal connection exists between the injury and 
the worker's employment duties. 
Appellants contend that the injury occurring to 
George Green on September 6, 1985 did not occur by accident 
and, further, if it had, a causal connection between the injury 
and the worker's duties was not shown. 
Mr. Green sustained an internal failure when he 
lifted a bucket of debris in September of 1985. If an ordinary 
or usual exertion results in an unexpected injury, the injury 
occurs by accident. The critical inquiry is whether the exer-
tion causes an unplanned or unintended result. The term Mby 
accident" does not require an unusual event. The basic and 
indispensable ingredient of an accident is unexpectedness. 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
Appellants contend that George Green had experienced 
similar pain in his low back on occasions prior to the the 
-6-
September 6, 1985 injury, and, therefore, the injury he sus-
tained on that day was not an unexpected result from an exer-
tion. It is true that Mr. Green experienced back pain from 
time to time prior to his disabling injury. Mr. Green had been 
employed by American Roofing for several years prior to his 
injury. During that time, he had repeatedly engaged in roof 
repair work. He experienced pain while performing the duties 
of his job, but this pain subsided. The more intense pain 
experienced by George Green in September, 1985 did not subside. 
It did not subside because the exertion on that day damaged his 
lumbar spine. The injury to his spine was sufficiently severe 
to render him permanently disabled. The record does not 
support the conclusion that George Green expected to receive a 
disabling injury when he lifted a bucket of debris from his 
truck. Rather, the record supports the Commission's conclusion 
that Mr. Green had worked for several years repairing roofs and 
that he believed he could continue to do so without experienc-
ing a disabling injury to his lumbar spine. The Commission's 
conclusion that George Green sustained an injury by accident is 
within the limits of reasonableness and rationality. 
POINT II[ 
THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION REASONABLY 
CONCLUDED THAT A CAUSAL CONNECTION EXISTS 
BETWEEN THE INJURY AND GREEN'S DUTIES. 
When George Green became employed w i I. h American 
Roofing, he suffered from a bad back. This preexisting back 
condition subjects an injured worker to different causation 
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requirements than those imposed upon a worker without pre-
existing medical conditions. The legal causation requirement 
and medical causation requirement applicable to workers 
suffering from preexisting conditions are set forth in the 
Allen decision. Appellants do not contest that Green has 
satisfied the medical causation test. Under the medical 
causation test, Green had the burden of showing that the 
exertion of his occupation resulted in the disabLing injury. 
The medical panel physician, Dr. Thomas Bauman, concluded that 
the exertion required by Green's employment contributed to the 
advanced degeneration of his lumbar discs. 
Mr. Green's employer takes exception to the 
Industrial Commission's conclusion that Green's employment 
duties were the "legal" cause of his injury. 
Mr. Green's employer does not take exception with 
the legal principle that the aggravation of a preexisting 
condition may constitute a compensable industrial accident. 
Yet, under the legal causation requirement, a claimant with a 
preexisting condition must show that his "employment contri-
buted something substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced in everyday life because of his condition." A_l J en
 f su£ina 
at 25. The legal causation requirement is designed to distin-
guish those risks encountered in everyday life from those risks 
that are incident to one's employment. An objective standard 
is used when comparing a particular employee's exertion with 
the usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life. 
This was done to provide a more consistent and predictable 
standard for the Utah State Industrial Commission. Certain 
exertions are believed to be typical exertions expected of men 
and women in the latter part of the twentieth century, i.e. 
"taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying 
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, 
lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing the stairs 
in a building." A_U_en, supra at 26. 
In reviewing the conduct of the injured empLoyee, 
the Industrial Commission reasoned that George Green was 
injured while engaging in an exertion more substantial than 
that engaged in by a typical twentieth century person. The 
Commission reasoned that weight alone is not the only criteria 
to be used in applying the Allen legal causation. The manner 
in which the lifting is done "can significantly increase strain 
on the body." The Commission observed that "the applicant was 
leaning over the side of the truck and pulling and lifting at 
the same time . . . ." The weight involved was significant and 
as the injured employee lifted this weight with his arms 
outstretched across the side of the truck, the bucket became 
snagged on another bucket. This placed additional strain on 
Green's back, thereby resulting in a disabling injury. 
The Commission acted within the limits of reason-
ableness and rationality in concluding that the manner in which 
George Green attempted to lift a thirty pound bucket of debris 
removed his conduct from that of the typical, twentieth century 
-9-
person. This conclusion should not be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY COMPUTED 
THE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE OE THE INJURED EMPLOYEE. 
The benefits provided to an injured employee who 
sustains a disability are based upon his "average weekly wage." 
The formulas to calculate the average weekly wage of disabled 
employees are set forth in Section 35-1-75, Utah Code Ann. 
Subsection 1 of Section 75 sets forth various methods to be 
followed in determining an employee's average weekly wage 
depending on whether the wages are fixed by the hour, day, 
week, etc. See Produce v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 657 
P.2d 1354 (Utah 1983). Part (e) of subsection 1 provides: 
"If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by 
the hour, the average weekJy wage shall be 
determined by multiplying the hourJy rate by the 
number of hours the employee would have worked for 
the week if the accident had not intervened. In no 
case shall the hourly wage be multiplied by Jess 
than twenty hours for the purpose of determining the 
weekly wage.M 
George Green was a part-time employee. He was paid 
hourly at the rate of $.1.5.47 per hour. No party has taken 
exception to the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that 
at the time of the inrlustrial accident, Mr. Green worked 12 to 
14 hours per week. 
The statute at issue is not ambiguous. It requires 
that the hourly wage of an injured employee be multiplied by a 
number not less than 20 for the purpose of determining "the 
-i n-
employee's average weekly wage". This yielded an average 
weekly wage of $309.40. 
In determining the benefit rate pursuant to Section 
35-1-57, Utah_^!ode Ann.
 r Green's "average weekly wage" of 
$309.40 was multiplied by 2/3, yielding a compensation rate of 
$206.00. Because the compensation rate exceeded Green's actual 
wages of $201.11, a compensation rate in the amount of his 
actual wages was applied. (No exception was taken to the 
reduction of his compensation rate from $206 to $201.) 
Mr. Green's employer objects to the decision of the 
Industrial Commission awarding him benefits at a compensation 
rate equal to his actual working wages at the time of his 
injury. The employer contends that such a ruling is unfair, 
for it serves as a disincentive to Mr. Green to return to work, 
and it gives preferential treatment to part-time employees who 
are hired for less than 20 hours per week. 
The Industrial Commission consistently construes 
provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act in accordance with 
its purpose to alleviate a hardship upon workers and their 
families when disabling work related injuries occur. Baker v. 
Industrial Comm., 405 P.2d 613 (in ah 1965). As a result of a 
series of work related injuries, Mr. Green was found by the 
Industrial Commission to be permanently and totally disabled. 
The employer's concern that Mr. Green lacks sufficient incen-
tive to return to work is unnecessary as the Commission has 
rendered its opinion that Mr. Green is unemployable in light of 
-11-
his physical impairment, his training, and his age. The 
employer has taken no exception to the finding of the Commis-
sion that Mr. Green is unemployable. 
It is undisputed that workers experience tremendous 
hardship when they sustain a disabling injury. The intent of 
the Worker's Compensation Act is to provide sustenance to an 
injured employee and his family during the time of need. 
Produce v. Industr ial Commission__of Utah , supra . Consistent 
with this purpose, a minimum compensation rate is established 
for part-time employees. The Commission assures all parties 
concerned that no windfall will occur to an employee by setting 
the maximum compensation rate at the actual wages earned by the 
employee at the time of his injury. Such a scheme is fair and 
consistent with the intent of the statute. It cannot be said 
that the Commission's calculation of Green's compensation rate 
is unreasonable in light of the clear directive set forth in 
§35-1-75, Utah Code Ann. 
Regarding the final argument of the appellant regard-
ing reimbursement, Mr. Green expresses no opinion as this issue 
concerns reimbursement of benefits paid to Mr. Green by the 
Second Injury Fund, a matter that does not concern an injured 
employee. 
CQNCLU^J^N 
George Green respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the decision of the Utah State Industrial Commission 
awarding him lifetime benefits at a rate of $201 per week 
DATED this ) <? day of November, 1987. 
WINDER & HASLAM 
By 
W i l l i a m W. D o w n e p ^ J r . 
A t t o r n e y fo r Rjz^pondent 
George R. Green 
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35-1-75. Average weekly wage - Basis of computation. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, the average 
weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury 
shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute the weekly 
compensation rate and shall be determined as follows: 
(a) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the year, the average weekly wage shall be that 
yearly wage divided by 52. 
(b) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the month, the average weekly wage shall be that 
monthly wage divided by 4 1/3. 
(c) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the week, that amount shall be the average 
weekly wage. 
(d) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the date, the weekly wage shall be determined by 
multiplying the daily wage by the number of days and 
fractions of days in the week during which the employee 
under a contract of hire was working at the time of the 
accident, or would have worked if the accident had not 
intervened. In no case shall the daily wage be multi-
plied by Jess than three for the purpose of determining 
the weekly wage. 
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(e) If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed 
by the hour, the average weekly wage shall be determined 
by multiplying the hourly rate by the number of hours the 
employee would have worked for the week if the accident 
had not intervened. In no case shall the hourly wage be 
multiplied by less than 20 for the purpose of determining 
the weekly wage. 
(f) If at the time of the injury the hourly wage has 
not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the wage for the 
purpose of calculating compensation shall be the usual 
wage for similar services where those services are 
rendered by paid employees. 
(g)(i) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the output of the employee, the average weekly 
wage shall be the wage most favorable to the employee 
computed by dividing by thirteen the wages, not including 
overtime or premium pay, of the employee earned through 
that employer in the first, second, third, or forth period 
of thirteen consecutive calendar weeks in the 52 weeks 
immediately preceding the injury. 
(ii) If the employee has been employed by that 
employer less than thirteen calendar weeks immediate-
ly preceding the injury, his average weekly wage 
shall be computed as under Subsection (I)(g)(i), 
presuming the wages, not including overtime or 
premium pay, to be the amount he would have earned 
had he been so employed for the full thirteen 
calendar weeks immediately preceding the injury and 
had worked, when work was available to other 
employees, in a similar occupation, 
(iii) If none of the methods in Subsection (1) 
will fairly determine the average weekly wage in a 
particular case, the Commission shal] use such other 
method as will, based on the facts presented, fairly 
determine the employee's average weekly wage. 
(2) When the average weekly wage of the injured employee 
at the time of the injury is determined as in this section 
provided, it shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute 
the weekly compensation rate. After the weekly compensation 
has been computed, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar. 
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